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that is everywhere present in the organism. It presides over the process of generation from the moment of the fertilization of the ovum; it looks after the various movements of digestion and reflex action, as well as governing the highest functions of mind. These functions are the perquisites of different grades of mind, but how they unite or interact is not said. All is delightfully vague.

As a presentation of animism in historical and current form the work is well done, but one who reads it feels that the explanations offered are no explanations. Between the two alternatives of teleology or mechanism there is no decision on basis of fact. The only answer to the fundamental problems they raise is at present "we do not know." The advantage of mechanism over teleology is that the former offers a hope of a solution in the end, while the latter merely gives up the problems and glosses over our ignorance with words like mind, entelechy, vital force, or what not that explain nothing, but pretend to. The hope of scientific advancement lies in continued analysis and investigation rather than in the hypostatizing of unanalyzable and incomprehensible entities.

Lest one should be misled by the statement of disagreement with the conclusions and methods of the author, it should be emphasized that the book is a real contribution to the topic discussed. The material is well chosen and accurate in its statement of the views of others, and is excellently presented. The proof-reader has been careless at times, and there are minor mistakes. Professor McGilvary appears as Miss in one place, for example.

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Nietzsche. PAUL ELMER MORE. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company. 1911. Pp. 87.

The author of this essay on Nietzsche is evidently one of those men of letters who have not sensed that fundamental distinction between philosophers—between the thinker of cool, logical, careful temperament who is stirred to action only by the thoughts and systems of other men, and spends his time in solving problems that others have set for him—and the gigantic, incalculable thinker, who reacts violently and directly to his spiritual environment, and whose work is not the neatly-ordered next step in a process, but an individual explosive interpretation of life. No one can deny that Nietzsche is emphatically a philosopher of this latter type, but Mr. More has treated him as if he were numbered among the former.

Devoting one third of his book to a sketch of the gradual evolution of the ideas of egotism and sympathy from Hobbes through Locke, Mandeville, Hume, and Rousseau, he has forced Nietzsche into this polite scheme as the culminating figure, as a mere reaction against the sentimental absurdities of romanticism. But to get him in, he has had to do such violence to the spirit of Nietzsche as to prune away much that is really significant in him. Such an attempt to explain a genius like Nietzsche simply will not do. It was not the dainty sentimentalism of the eight-

eenth century or the amiable humanitarianism of the Romanticists that roused the fury of Nietzsche, not any fashionable theory of an age that filled his soul with gall, but something far more elemental—the spirit of an European civilization stretching out behind him, reeking, as he thought, with a slave-morality, and stretching out in the future ahead of him, degenerate with the poison of a levelling democracy. It was in the heated days of Marxian Socialism that Nietzsche's early days were spent, and Marx derived not from any British ethicists or French romanticists, but from a materialized Hegel; German Socialism was, from the first, economic and materialistic, not ethical. And Nietzsche made this materialism thoroughly his own, while reacting against the implications that outraged his curiously complex character of fierce pride and temperamental weakness. His innate aristocracy was outraged by the menace of industrial democracy, remorselessly working itself out by evolutionistic laws, and his passion for power and strength was insulted by the sacrificial ethics of Christianity. No neat Hobbes-Locke-Hume-Rousseau dynasty of thought could have inflamed that passionate moral anger; it took the vision of a gradual degradation of power and genius to one mediocre level to madden him. It was not the silly tears of Sterne or Henry Brooke that made him trample on the "Sermon on the Mount," but a patient, apathetic Christian civilization. No one can understand Nietzsche who does not feel these two world-spirits, against which he hurled his strength, or see in his philosophy a sort of world-projection of himself out upon European civilization, past, present, and to come.

No one would recognize in the shrunken, frock-coated Nietzsche of Mr. More the wild blasphemer who, a prey to the morbid fascination which makes us imitate the thing we loathe, wrote his best works in the sublime style of the Gospels, at the same time that he touched with ruthless hand the weakest spots of Christian ethics. The author even has the suggestion of an apology for Nietzsche's audacities, and a little patronizing pity for his rage: how Nietzsche would have hated being apologized for or pitied! The author shows his sympathy with the Nietzschean spirit, however, in passages such as these: "He [Nietzsche], too, saw the danger that threatens true progress in any system of education and government that makes the advantage of the average rather than the distinguished man its first object," and, "It would be possible to establish from statistics a direct ratio between the spread of humanitarian schemes of reform and the increase of crime and suicide."

The author has much to say of the effects of naturalism on the modern world, and his wholesale merging of humanitarianism, social reform, socialism, romanticism, and naturalism, as equivalent and interchangeable terms, while sometimes ingenious, is not especially convincing. Nietzsche was the most naturalistic of philosophers, and if romanticism and naturalism are kindred expressions of a lawlessness and lack of restraint and limitation, as Mr. More assumes, it is hard to fit Nietzsche into his scheme as the arch-anti-romanticist. Similarly, the implication that Nietzsche is somehow a prophet of concentration and rationality, of order and

serene art—the ideal of all who oppose the extravagancies of modern culture—is difficult to reconcile with anything we know of Nietzsche's works. Modern Socialism, too, which Mr. More lumps with romanticism and humanitarianism, is most materialistic, and bases its philosophy on the doctrine of evolution. These facts make Mr. More's use of the categories less suggestive than they might have been had he been dealing with a less original genius than Nietzsche, who defies classification or interpretation in conventional terms. The inconsistencies into which the author is led are proof that such a placing of the philosopher is really irrelevant.

It is natural that the man who translated all values should trail paradoxes after him. The most glaring of these is that the supermen of to-day are practising and professing Christianity; while the most brilliant Socialists are preaching Nietzscheanism. For our industrial barons, our business geniuses, are practising an undiluted ethics of power and ruthlessness, and professing the mild and sacrificial ethics of Jesus. That is, Nietzsche has expressed perfectly the working philosophy of an age; some of his works read almost like a satire on modern industry looked at from the point of view of the masters. And yet he has inspired the social philosophy of some of the most resourceful of the leaders who are trying through Socialism to overturn that mastery. For besides Mr. More, Nietzsche numbers among his disciples Mr. Bernard Shaw, and consistently. For Mr. Shaw says simply, Let us all be supermen! A world of men longing to be supermen would soon free itself! If that unorganized mass of people that we call with such unconscious self-satirization "the working-classes," could be filled with the will to power, the salvation of society, Mr. Shaw says, would be at hand. And in this, Mr. Shaw is a better prophet of Nietzsche than is Mr. More. For would not Nietzsche have gloried, had his pessimism permitted him to think it possible, in a *race* of supermen?

Thus, ignored by his consistent followers, the modern business men, enthusiastically hailed as prophet by his enemies, the Socialists, and deprived of what he believed to be his sound scientific basis of Darwinism—the doctrine of the survival of the fittest—by changing evolutionary theory, Nietzsche occupies to-day a curiously anomalous position. The divergent effects of his philosophy indicate his place as a creative thinker; his influence will grow rather than wane. And we may be sure that he is more fruitful, more stimulating and profound, than would appear from the interpretation and point of view which are presented in this little book.

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Lectures on Fundamental Concepts of Algebra and Geometry. JOHN WESLEY YOUNG. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. vii + 247.

The philosopher who wishes to become acquainted with the mathematician's point of view concerning the foundations of mathematics, and